Corruption and support for decentralisation by Kuhn, Theresa & Pardos-Prado, Sergi
European Journal of Political Research : – , 2020 1
doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12420
Corruption and support for decentralisation
THERESA KUHN1 & SERGI PARDOS-PRADO2
1Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands; 2School of Social and Political
Sciences, University of Glasgow, United Kingdom
Abstract. Existing explanations of individual preferences for decentralisation and secession focus on collective
identity, economic considerations and party politics. This paper contributes to this literature by showing that
preferences for fiscal and political decentralisation are also driven by concern about the quality of government in the
face of corruption. It makes two claims. Firstly, information on national-level corruption decreases satisfaction
with national politicians, and subsequently increases preferences for decentralisation and secession. Secondly,
information on regional-level corruption pushes citizens of highly corrupt regions to prefer national retrenchment
and unitary states. The effects of this political compensation mechanism crosscut national identities and involve
regions that are not ethnically or economically different from the core. We test our argument using a survey
experiment in Spain and confirm its cross-national generalisability with data from the European Values Study.
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Introduction
Decentralisation has been one of the most important political developments of the past few
decades as many developing and advanced democracies have delegated authority to subnational
governments (Falleti 2010; Hooghe et al. 2016; Marks et al. 2008; Rodden 2004; Wibbels 2006).
Despite the political salience of this phenomenon, the micro-foundations of public preferences for
decentralisation have received scarce scholarly attention. This research gap is particularly pressing
given the unexpected polarisation of some centre-periphery conflicts in Europe, and the recent role
of regional inequalities fuelling the success of nationalist and populist parties (Colantone & Stanig
2018; Golder 2016). Understanding the mechanisms behind centre–periphery conflicts has become
a particularly relevant endeavour.
In this paper, we argue that corruption and quality of governance at different geographical levels
are a key determinant of preferences for more or less decentralisation. More specifically, we show
that information on central-level corruption directly increases public support for decentralisation,
and indirectly increases support for decentralisation and self-determination through dissatisfaction
with the national government. Similarly, information on corruption at regional levels can trigger
more support for recentralisation in highly corrupt regions. This compensation hypothesis builds
on the benchmarking argument which is used to explain support for European integration (Bauhr &
Charron 2018; De Vries 2018; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000), and proves to be an important mechanism
to understand sub-national centre-periphery conflicts. More importantly, the effects of corruption
awareness cut across different partisan loyalties and national identities and transcend the opposition
between economic and cultural explanations found in the literature so far.
We test our argument in a vignette design using a large-scale representative survey experiment
in Spain. To study the causal effect of corruption on preferences for decentralisation, we randomise
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a set of national and regional corruption primes. We scrutinise the external validity of our findings
by analysing the relationship between corruption perception and support for decentralisation using
cross-national survey data from the European Values Study (EVS).
This paper contributes to existing research on support for decentralisation in three ways.
Firstly, it provides a new theoretical framework by highlighting the importance of low quality
of governance at different geographical levels of government. With the exception of Guinjoan &
Rodon (2014) who see support for decentralisation as endogenous to the political system, extant
research has almost exclusively focused on collective identity (Liñeira & Cetra 2015, Maio et al.
2003; Serrano 2013), economic considerations (Balcells et al. 2015; Beramendi 2012; Muñoz &
Tormos 2015) and party politics (Amat 2012; Brancati 2006; Torcal & Mota 2013; Toubeau &
Wagner 2016) as main explanations for decentralisation preferences. Our approach brings political
factors back in, and it challenges the conventional view that claims for decentralisation and
independence are limited to regions that are economic and/or cultural outliers vis-à-vis the rest
of the state.
Secondly, our paper also speaks to the literature on how corruption affects public opinion.
While the effect of corruption on voting behaviour seems to be moderated by ideological priors and
a number of utility calculations (Anduiza et al. 2013; De Vries & Solaz 2017; Fernández-Vázquez
et al. 2016), the effect on support for decentralisation seems more pervasive. Our mediation and
moderation analyses show that corruption affects decentralisation preferences mainly through
governmental satisfaction (Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012), and not via
nationalism nor partisan identities. This implies that the polarisation of centre–periphery conflicts
is not only caused by economic utilitarianism or competing collective identities, but also seems to
be a reaction to a poor quality of governance.
Thirdly, this paper brings the scholarly discussion on support for decentralisation a step further
by shedding light on causality. Existing studies mainly rely on observational data, which is
vulnerable to unobserved and reciprocal relationships between preferences and institutions. In
contrast, our methodological strategy combining a survey experiment, mediation analysis and
cross-national survey analysis helps us to maximise both external and internal validity.
Public support for decentralisation: The state of the art
Existing research on attitudes towards decentralisation has emphasised three aspects: economic
inequality, collective identity, and party politics. We shortly discuss these approaches before
introducing corruption as an additional explanatory factor.
Support for decentralisation is often explained by redistributive conflicts in the context
of pronounced interregional economic inequality (Beramendi 2012). Under the assumption of
progressive taxation, net transfers of resources and income-maximising motivations, citizens in
wealthy regions are expected to support decentralisation to keep taxpayers’ money at home. In
contrast, regions that do not fare well economically rely on interregional fiscal transfers, and
therefore, their residents are expected to be more reserved about decentralisation. In a survey
experiment in Spain, Balcells et al. (2015) find that regional income positions influence citizen
support for interregional redistribution, especially if voters are informed about the true income of
their region. Focusing on individual differences, a study on public support for Catalan secession
from Spain (Muñoz & Tormos 2015) shows that exposure to information highlighting either the
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economic costs or benefits of independence significantly influence attitudes towards secession,
especially among individuals with dual identifications with Catalonia and Spain.
The other key explanation of support for decentralisation refers to collective identity (Forsyth
1989; Keating 2001; Liñeira & Cetra 2015; Maio et al. 2003; Marks et al. 2008; Serrano
2013; Henderson et al. 2015). Culturally and/or ethnically distinct regions develop competing
subnational identities, which lead to public demands for sovereignty. As Marks et al. (2008: 175)
argue, ‘individuals prefer rulers who share their ethno-cultural norms’. Hence, strong subnational
identities drive public support for decentralisation. In the words of Brancati (2006: 658), ‘strong
regional identities are the basis for all forms of secessionism’. Central states use decentralisation
and federalism as ‘an antidote to nationalism’ (Smith 1995: 3): by granting more rights and
independence to subnational units, central institutions hope to appease regional upsurges. The
examples of Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Flanders are a case in point. More
generally, Hooghe & Marks (2009: 2013) argue that government structures are a result of the
tension between efficiency of governance and community.
Empirical research finds some support for these expectations. Using field and laboratory
experiments prior to a referendum on the devolution from Britain to Wales, Maio et al. (2003)
find that intergroup attitudes are significantly related to support for devolution. Analysing survey
data from Catalonia, Serrano (2013) finds that Catalan identifiers are more likely to support Catalan
independence. However, challenging the identity hypothesis, his analyses also show that Catalan
independence receives widespread support across the entire Catalan society, not only among
voters with strong Catalan identifications. Using experiments in Spain, Balcells et al. (2015) find
that out-group concerns regarding ethnically and culturally distinct regions structure support for
redistribution across Spanish regions.
Finally, previous research has also highlighted the role of party politics (Amat 2012; Brancati
2006; Guinjoan & Rodon 2014; Torcal & Mota 2013; Toubeau & Wagner 2016). Political parties,
both at the central and at the regional level, can structure public opinion by putting issues of
decentralisation on the political agenda, by making decentralisation salient and by framing and
reinterpreting it (Riker 1990). According to Brancati (2006), regional parties play a crucial role
in promoting claims for secessionism, and in extreme cases, in fuelling ethnic conflict. They
do so by ‘reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that causes certain
groups to feel threatened in a country, and mobilising groups to engage in ethnic conflict and
secessionism or supporting terrorist organisations that participate in these activities’ (Brancati
2006: 656). Using representative survey data from Spain, Torcal & Mota (2013) find that both
national and regional parties influence preferences for the territorial organisation of the state.
Guinjoan & Rodon (2014) show that in Spanish regions without a different subnational identity,
political parties can effectively stir support for decentralisation among voters. Also focusing on
Spain, Amat (2012: 450) shows that ‘the rhetoric of political parties can influence the nature of
inter-regional redistributive preferences by affecting the saliency of nationalism’.
Theory and hypotheses
While we do not question the relevance of collective identity, economic considerations, or party
politics, we argue that existing research has largely ignored a highly relevant piece in the puzzle
of support for decentralisation: concern about the quality of governance – a very prominent aspect
of which is political corruption (Holmberg et al. 2009). We define corruption as ‘the misuse of an
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official position for one’s own private benefit or the benefit of a certain group in society’ (Neudorfer
& Neudorfer 2015: 3; see also De Vries & Solaz 2017; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Sandholtz & Koetzle
2000). We therefore focus on political performance and governance, and not on the merits of
different institutional designs.
We argue that citizens follow a compensation mechanism whereby information on corruption
at one geographical level increases dissatisfaction with that very same tier, and subsequently
increases preferences for an alternative level of government. The compensation hypothesis has
been developed in the literature analysing support for European integration but has not been applied
to the study of sub-national politics. Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) developed and tested a model based
on a political cost-benefit analysis with the following prediction: poor performance and corruption
in national institutions, coupled with positive evaluations of supranational ones, will trigger
support for European levels of government. This argument has been subsequently incorporated
into a more general benchmarking theory of support for European integration (De Vries 2018).
According to this framework, citizens rely on informational shortcuts and express political
support for supranational integration depending on how national institutions are performing. The
compensation hypothesis has received notable empirical support in the previous literature (Bauhr
& Charron 2018; De Vries 2018; Kritzinger 2003; Muñoz et al. 2011).
There are good reasons to expect similar mechanisms with respect to preferences for sub-
national decentralisation. The implication for corruption at the central government level is clear:
when citizens are exposed to information on corruption at the central level, preferences for regional
levels of government should increase. Macro-level perspectives in the literature have focused on
higher quality of governance as the main motivation for decentralisation (Escobar-Lemmon & Ross
2014; Fisman & Gatti 2002; Lederman et al. 2005; Riker 1975; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Weingast
1995; Wibbels 2006). The link between these macro-approaches and the study of public attitudes,
however, remains surprisingly underexplored. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: Information on corruption at the central level of government will increase support for
decentralisation.
When corruption is present in regional governments, the compensation hypothesis would
expect an increased opportunity for recentralisation. However, while in the scenario described
in H1, there is only one central government to benchmark, corruption at the regional level
involves different regions with varying levels of performance. If benchmarking is indeed a
heuristic, the effect of information on widespread regional corruption should be conditional on the
level of corruption in that region compared to other regions. Information on regional corruption
among regions that are themselves more corrupt than average should increase preferences for
recentralisation. The benefits of delegating power to the central state to get rid of particularistic
and local corruption practices could outweigh the costs of doing so.
But the cost-benefit analysis is not the same for a low corruption region in a context of
generalised regional corruption. Centralising power in that context could increase the cost of
redistribution to poorly performing regions in cases where there is a centralised authority, and
hence increase the burden of coordinating with corrupt regions. This benchmarking logic thus
provides a novel conditional expectation between general corruption levels and the relative
performance of the region:
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H2: Information on corruption at the regional level of government will increase (decrease)
support for centralisation in regions with relatively high (low) levels of corruption.
If corruption awareness indeed influences support for decentralisation, it is theoretically and
empirically relevant to investigate the underlying mechanism of this relationship. There are good
reasons to expect that corruption awareness decreases satisfaction with politicians at that particular
level. H1 and H2 imply a political performance mechanism. Stokes (1963: 372) referred to
corruption as a typical valence issue: voters should generally perceive corruption as an undesirable
political outcome and favour the politician that is least associated with it. Moreover, corruption
decreases the government’s ability of public goods provision and distorts the outcome of political
processes (Mauro 1995; Rose-Ackerman 1999). A large body of research shows that awareness
of corruption indeed decreases citizen satisfaction with, and trust in, political leaders (Anderson
& Goodyear-Grant 2010; Bowler et al. 2007; Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012; Rothstein & Eek
2009; Seligson, 2002; Wagner et al. 2009). In a similar vein, Guinjoan & Rodon (2014) show
that satisfaction with the regional government is linked to support for decentralisation. Therefore,
we expect the following indirect causal mechanism:
H3: Information on corruption at the central (regional) level of government should decrease
satisfaction with that level of government, and subsequently increase (decrease) support
for decentralisation.
It is important to note that the benchmarking argument presented here is not contradictory
with standard accountability theories expecting voters to punish corrupt incumbents (De Vries &
Solaz 2017). On the basis of classical approaches to institutional design, it is reasonable to assume
that the division of power between parties and in parliaments is independent from federal and
territorial dimensions of competition (Lijphart 2012). This means that in a context of national
corruption, for instance, it is not contradictory to expect both an electoral punishment of the
national incumbent, and an increased preference for proximal forms of government. The key for the
validity of our argument is to show an exogenous impact of corruption on territorial preferences,
and independently from partisan considerations and unobserved accountability dynamics that may
also be at play.
Empirical strategy
We harness a unique online survey experiment conducted in Spain in 2015 to test our hypotheses
empirically. We show the cross-national generalisability of our findings using EVS data.
Spain lends itself well to the study of our question because debates on decentralisation and
Catalan independence have frequently dominated the political agenda. Since Spain’s transition
to democracy in 1978, its Autonomous Communities1 have increasingly received more rights
(Hooghe et al. 2016: 495). Moreover, in the past few years, accounts of political corruption among
politicians of the central and of the regional governments have made headlines (The Economist
2015). Therefore, we do not fear that respondents might not believe the information on corruption.
In fact, the most prominent scandal of illegal party funding that has been salient in recent years
(Gürtel case) implicated both national and regional politicians, so corruption at both levels is
highly credible. Levels of corruption in Spain can be compared to other Western democracies.
In the corruption perception index 2014 (Transparency International 2014), Spain ranked 37 out
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of 174 countries; on par with Israel, and close to other EU member states such as Poland. Its
corruption index score of 60 is slightly below the EU-28 average (65), indicating that it is somewhat
more corrupt than the average EU member state.
Survey experiment
The online survey experiment was conducted among 1,920 respondents in Spain in spring 20152
(for descriptive statistics, see Table A1 in the online Appendix). Respondents were randomly
assigned to one of the following conditions: (1) no corruption prime at all (control group), (2)
a prime on corruption among Spanish politicians in general (general corruption prime), (3) a
prime on corruption among politicians of the Spanish central government (central corruption
prime) and (4) a prime on corruption among politicians of the governments of the Autonomous
Communities (regional corruption prime). Hence, our experiment focuses on the (short-term)
quality of government performance when a negative shock occurs and not on the (long-term)
quality of the institutional design. Table A2 in the online Appendix presents the wording of our
treatment conditions.3 Table A3 in the online Appendix provides balance tests, confirming that
the likelihood of belonging to one or another treatment group did not depend on any observable
included in the models below. Table A7 and Figures A1 and A2 in the online Appendix provide
the distribution of cases, treatments and outcomes across regions, indicating that sampling and
randomisation worked well across the Spanish geography.
Decentralisation can entail shifts of authority to the subnational level in the administrative,
political, fiscal and constitutional realm (Falleti 2010; Hooghe et al. 2016). We report results
concerning political decentralisation in the paper; Table A4 in the online Appendix replicates
our main models using preferences for fiscal decentralisation. After being exposed to the relevant
vignette, all respondents were asked the following question, which serves as dependent variable:
We will now present some alternative forms of territorial organization in Spain. Which
one do you agree with most: (1) A state with one central government without autonomous
communities; (2) A state with autonomous communities as at present; (3) A state in which
the autonomous communities have more autonomy than today; (4) A state in which the
autonomous communities have the possibility of becoming independent states; Don’t know.
Following Hypothesis 1, we expect that information on corruption at the central level triggers
support for decentralisation. Hence, respondents in the treatment group (3) should be significantly
more supportive of decentralisation than respondents in the control group (1).
Table 1 reports two multinomial logistic models with clustered standard errors at the regional
level. The first model shows the unconditional effect of our corruption primes, and the second adds
a number of potential confounders. Preference for the status quo serves as the reference category of
the dependent variable. The control variables included are: subjective social class (working class,
lower-middle class, middle class, upper-middle class); having completed higher education; left-
right ideology (operationalised in a 0–10 scale where 0 is extreme left); national identity (where
feeling attached only to one’s region serves as the reference category); feeling close to Partido
Popular (PP, Spanish conservative party in power during data collection) versus all other parties;
and regional inequality (ratio between average regional per-capita GDP in Spain and each region’s
per capita GDP, where higher values correspond to poorer regions).
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Table 1. Multinomial logit models predicting support for decentralisation
Model 1 Model 2
One central government vs. status quo
No corruption prime ref. ref.
General corruption prime −0.24 (0.13) −0.27 (0.14)
Central corruption prime −0.06 (0.22) −0.06 (0.23)
Regional corruption prime −0.19 (0.14) −0.19 (0.14)
Lower class ref.
Lower-middle class 0.16 (0.19)
Middle class −0.05 (0.13)
Middle-upper class −0.41 (0.41)
Higher education 0.02 (0.13)
Age 0.02*** (0.01)
Female −0.33* (0.13)
Regional inequality −0.33 (0.3)
Region identity only ref.
Region identity first, then Spanish −0.001 (0.47)
Spanish first, then region identity 0.42 (0.42)
Spanish identity only 1.13* (0.5)
Left-right ideology 0.12*** (0.03)
PP voter −0.36 (0.22)
Intercept 0.27 (0.15) −0.98* (0.47)
More autonomy vs. status quo
No corruption prime ref. ref.
General corruption prime 0.21 (0.18) 0.24 (0.17)
Central corruption prime 0.43* (0.17) 0.4* (0.16)
Regional corruption prime 0.17 (0.23) 0.18 (0.23)
Lower class ref.
Lower-middle class 0.07 (0.16)
Middle class 0.03 (0.21)
Middle-upper class −0.22 (0.49)
Higher education −0.15 (0.16)
Age 0.01 (0.01)
Female −0.06 (0.12)
Regional inequality −1.29 (1)
Region identity only ref.
Region identity first, then Spanish −0.51 (0.4)
Spanish first, then region identity −1.42*** (0.4)
Spanish identity only −0.88* (0.45)
(Continued)
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Table 1. Continued
More autonomy vs. status quo
No corruption prime ref. ref.
Left-right ideology −0.11* (0.04)
PP voter −0.72 (0.39)
Intercept −0.53* (0.25) 1.93 (1.08)
Possibility to secede vs. status quo
No corruption prime ref. ref.
General corruption prime −0.05 (0.1) −0.24 (0.23)
Central corruption prime 0.17 (0.21) 0.07 (0.18)
Regional corruption prime 0.16 (0.19) 0.19 (0.2)
Lower class ref.
Lower-middle class −0.26 (0.18)
Middle class −0.23 (0.25)
Middle-upper class 0.03 (0.39)




Region identity only ref.
Region identity first, then Spanish −2.67*** (0.26)
Spanish first, then region identity −4.6*** (0.37)
Spanish identity −4.28*** (0.55)
Left-right ideology −0.22*** (0.05)
PP voter −1.55 (1.33)
Intercept −0.77 (0.62) 6.57** (2.46)
N individuals 1,507 1,507
N regions 19 19
Log-likelihood −2013.11 −1649.1
BIC 4,114 3,429.9
Source: Own survey experiment. Multinomial logit coefficients and standard errors clustered at the regional level
between parentheses. ***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05.
As expected by H1, the central government corruption prime consistently and significantly
increases support for granting regions more autonomy over keeping the current system in both
model specifications. In contrast, neither the general nor the regional corruption primes have
significant average effects. In terms of control variables, people living in regions with a GDP
per capita that is significantly below the Spanish average regional-per-capita GDP (i.e. our
regional inequality variable) are less likely to support granting regions the possibility to secede
over the status quo. Right-wing respondents are more favourable to a unitary state, and less
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Figure 1. Probability simulations for preferences for political decentralisation.
Source: Own survey experiment. Bars refer to change in probability of having one or another preference when being
exposed to central treatment condition versus control conditions, with 95 per cent confidence interval. Estimations
based on 10,000 random draws of the coefficients of Model 1 in Table 1.
favourable to decentralisation and self-determination. In comparison to people with exclusive
regional attachments, individuals with strong Spanish national identity are more favourable to a
unitary state, and less favourable to a decentralised state and secession. Individual social class and
voting for the central incumbent (PP) do not have significant effects. Overall, these results confirm
the importance of theoretical frameworks based on regional economic inequality and national
identity.
Figure 14 depicts probability simulations illustrating the main finding in Table 1, namely, the
effect of the central corruption prime on decentralisation preferences. On the basis of 10,000
random draws of Model 1 in Table 1, and compared to being in the control group, receiving
our central corruption prime increases the probability of preferring more regional autonomy by
10 percentage points and increases the probability to support secession by about 5 per cent. In
contrast, it decreases the probability of preferring the status quo by 15 per cent, and somewhat
decreases the probability of opting for a central state.
According to Table 1, the regional corruption prime has no significant direct effect on
preferences for decentralisation. However, H2 expected that information on a generalised
corruption environment at the regional level (Treatment 4) should have different effects depending
on the relative standing of the region. For citizens of regions above average corruption levels, it
would be rational to transfer sovereignty to a central authority. But for people living in relatively
low-corruption regions, it is more rational to keep the status quo rather than to share political
burdens in a unified government.
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Table 2. Interactions between corruption primes and relative regional corruption
One central government vs. status quo
No corruption prime ref.
General corruption prime −1.22 (1.11)
Central corruption prime −4.54** (1.56)
Regional corruption prime −3.08** (1.13)
Relative regional corruption −3.24** (1.03)
General corruption prime × relative
regional corruption
.95 (1.05)
Central corruption prime × relative
regional corruption
4.49** (1.44)









Source: Own survey experiment. Multinomial logit coefficients and standard errors clustered at the regional level
between parentheses. ***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05.
To empirically test H2, we measure regional corruption levels in Spain with data from the
2013 European regional quality of government index constructed by the Quality of Government
Institute (Charron et al. 2015). This index focuses on the quality of public services, impartiality
and corruption at the regional level. We focus on the normalised indicator of corruption (from 0
to 100), which we recode from lower to higher corruption values. To construct a region’s relative
corruption position within Spain, we calculate the ratio between the corruption values of each
region over the Spanish regional corruption mean. Higher values correspond to regions that are
more corrupt than the average.
Table 2 reports the interactions between our experimental corruption primes and the relative
corruption variable predicting preferences for recentralisation over the status quo.5 As expected,
the regional corruption prime increases support for recentralisation especially among citizens of
highly corrupt regions. Since it is difficult to interpret the magnitude, sign and significance of log
odds and interaction terms in multinomial models, Figure 2 reports the average marginal effects
of our regional corruption prime on the probability to prefer a single unitary state over the status
quo. In an environment where regional corruption is primed, citizens of clearly over-performing
regions (i.e. with low values in the X-axis) prefer recentralisation significantly less than people
living in high-corruption regions. The effects of regional corruption on the probability to prefer a
single unitary state over the status quo become statistically indistinguishable from zero at higher
levels of the regional corruption prime. The figure shows that the conditional effects are mainly
driven by lower values in the relative corruption variable, since the effects of regional corruption
become statistically indistinguishable from zero at higher levels of regional corruption.
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Figure 2. Average marginal effects of regional corruption prime on preferences for a single centralised state over
keeping the status quo. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source: Own survey experiment. Dots refer to the average marginal effect of the regional corruption prime in a fully
specified model, with 95 per cent confidence intervals. The conditioning variable (X-axis) is the relative corruption
position of the respondent’s region, with higher values indicating regions more corrupt than average.
The results in Table 2 also unveil an unexpected significant interaction between the central
corruption prime and regional corruption. In the context of double corruption pressure both at
the central and regional levels, citizens also want to significantly depart from the status quo and
favour a strongly centralised state. While this finding does not directly derive from a compensation
framework, it is relevant to see that low government quality at all geographical levels strengthens
national retrenchment and support for strong unitary states.
Our findings are in line with the compensation and benchmarking-theoretical rationales that
guided H1 and H2 above. These results are at odds with theoretical frameworks based on
congruence, whereby information on corruption at one level should decrease support for all
levels of government (Bauhr & Charron 2018; Kritzinger 2003; Muñoz et al. 2011). Figures
A3 and A4 in the online Appendix show that the marginal effects of our central and regional
corruption treatments are broadly equivalent across different forms of national identity and partisan
identification. The lack of clear heterogeneous treatment effects suggests that corruption can have
pervasive effects on territorial preferences across the population and across levels of national
and partisan identification. Tables A8 and A9 in the online Appendix replicate the same findings
reported in this section, but include regional fixed effects. This means that our results are not driven
by different conceptions and intensities of national identity in specific regions (i.e. Catalonia or the
Basque Country), or by any other unobserved regional specificity.
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Causal mechanisms
The previous section has shown that central corruption increases support for decentralisation,
and that regional corruption decreases support for the status quo in favour of unitary forms of
government among citizens of highly corrupt regions. The results also suggest that the effects of
our experimental manipulations are largely comparable across national or partisan identities, and
that corruption can have consistent direct effects.
Following Hypothesis 3, corruption perception shapes decentralisation preferences due to
dissatisfaction with the government rather than by changing national identity. When analysing the
indirect mechanism behind our central and regional corruption primes, we conduct a mediation
analysis where dissatisfaction with the national and regional government serves as mediating
variables, respectively. In this section, we show that our central government corruption prime
increases dissatisfaction towards that same level of government, and that this, in turn, increases
preferences for political decentralisation.
We test the indirect causal mechanism using the mediation analysis method proposed by Imai
et al. (2011). This method consists of three steps. Firstly, there needs to be evidence that the
exogenous treatment T ∈ (0,1) affects the mediating variable (M), while controlling for a range
of exogenous pre-treatment covariates. Secondly, there needs to be evidence that M affects the
outcome (Y), still controlling for the same range of covariates. Thirdly, there should be a significant
difference in the expected outcome when regressing it on the predicted values of M when T = 1,
and when T = 0. The latter step is quantified through the average causal mediation effect (ACME),
which is formalised as follows (Imai & Yamamoto 2010; Imai et al. 2011):
δ (T ) = Y (T, M (1)) − Y (T, M (0)) (1)
The quantity expressed in equation (1) can be interpreted as the indirect treatment effect on the
outcome through the mediating variable, where Y is the outcome, T is the treatment, M(1) is the
predicted value of the mediator under the treatment condition 1 and M(0) is the predicted value of
the mediator under the control condition 0.
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of mediation models predicting preferences for political
decentralisation. Table 3 reports the first two steps of the mediation sequence described above: the
first model tests whether the treatment affects the mediator, and the second model tests whether
the mediator affects the outcome. This is done for both central corruption (first two columns) and
regional corruption (last two columns). Table 4 reports the last step of the mediation analysis,
namely the ACME.
The first ordinary least squares (OLS) model of Table 3 shows a significant effect (p < 0.05) of
central-level corruption (a binary variable where 1 represents the central government corruption
prime, and 0 represents our control group) on the mediating variable, namely dissatisfaction
with the national government’s performance (‘Now thinking about the Spanish government, how
satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?’ 0–10 scale from extremely satisfied to extremely
dissatisfied).6 The second model of Table 3 validates the next step in the causal sequence, by
showing a positive and highly significant effect (p < 0.001) of dissatisfaction with the national
government on preferences for decentralisation (ordered from less to more decentralisation).
The first panel of Table 4 reports the last step of the causal mediation analysis of the effects
of central government corruption. The ACME statistics show significant effects in the expected
© 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Political Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Consortium for Political Research
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National government corruption via dissatisfaction with national government
ACME (treated) −0.01* −0.001 0.01* 0.01*
Direct effect (treated) −0.05* −0.002 0.03* 0.03*
Total effect −0.06* −0.001 0.03* 0.04*
Regional government corruption via dissatisfaction with regional government
ACME (treated) −0.0005 −0.00002 0.0002 0.0003
Direct effect (treated) −0.05 0.0007 0.02 0.03
Total effect −0.047 0.0007 0.02 0.03
Source: Own survey experiment. ***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05. Significance levels estimated via
nonparametric bootstrapped methods (1,000 simulations).
direction. The central corruption prime significantly increases the probability of preferring more
autonomy and the possibility for regions to secede via political dissatisfaction. By contrast, it
decreases the probability of preferring a single centralised state. The indirect effects of corruption
via dissatisfaction with the national government account for a third and a quarter of the total
effect of corruption on preferences for decentralisation and self-determination, respectively. It
is important to note that while the direct effects of central corruption on the possibility of self-
determination were not significant in the previous section, the indirect effects are significant.
Perceptions of bad national government performance are thus partly responsible for recent pushes
in favour of regional self-determination. Table A5 in the online Appendix shows the sensitivity of
our findings to the assumption of sequential ignorability.
The last two models of Table 3 test the effect of the regional corruption prime (vs. our control
group) on dissatisfaction with the regional government, and the effect of dissatisfaction with the
regional government on preferences for decentralisation. The bottom panel of Table 4 reports the
ACME statistics concerning the indirect effects of regional corruption. As opposed to the analysis
of national-level corruption above, Tables 3 and 4 reveal that the effect of our treatment on regional
government dissatisfaction and the ACME are always far from reaching conventional levels of
significance. While our analyses fully confirm H2 above by showing that information on regional
corruption is moderated by relative corruption levels between regions, they cannot confirm that the
mechanism goes only through dissatisfaction with the regional government (H3).
Tables A10 and A11 in the online Appendix report the same causal mediation analyses shown in
this section, but using national identity as a mediator. The purpose of this exercise is to test whether
the performance-based mechanism shown here is a genuinely distinctive driver of territorial
preferences, or whether corruption can also shape territorial preferences via collective identities
and nationalism. Interestingly, Tables A10 and A11 in the online Appendix show insignificant
effects of central or regional corruption on national identity, and insignificant indirect effects
on territorial preferences via national identity. Identity is naturally a very significant driver of
decentralisation preferences on its own, but not as a result of corruption perceptions. This means
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that the effects of corruption documented here are a rational and performance-based reaction, and
not driven or filtered by nationalism.
Cross-national generalisability
So far, we have presented findings from Spain, which could be a unique case in the link between
corruption and decentralisation debates. We therefore use cross-national survey data of the 1999
EVS (see descriptive statistics in Table B1 in the online Appendix) to show that Spain is not
an outlier in corruption and decentralisation, and that support for decentralisation is higher in
more corrupt countries. This analysis does not aim at causally identifying the effect of any of the
hypotheses above, but at showing that the main findings of our experiment can be generalised
beyond our specific case study.
To the best of our knowledge, the EVS is the only survey with a high number of countries
that covers support for decentralisation. The wording of our dependent variable is: ‘Please tell me
whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don’t you mind [to give] more power to
local authorities’. We recoded this variable into a dummy where 1 = good thing and 0 = anything
else. The EVS defines local authorities as the most salient administrative unit below the national
level (i.e. regions in Spain).7
We test whether the findings of our survey experiment in Spain are externally valid by analysing
to what extent corruption at the regional and national level correlates with individual support
for decentralisation. To capture national corruption, we rely on the corruption perception index
constructed by Transparency International,8 which is measured at the country level and recoded
from less to more corruption.9 To proxy regional corruption, we rely again on the European
Regional Quality of Government index constructed by the Quality of Government Institute
(Charron et al. 2015). This index is available for 206 regions in 24 European countries.
For our main experimental results to be externally valid, we should validate two findings.
Firstly, national corruption should be significantly related to support for decentralisation. Secondly,
regional corruption should depress preferences for decentralisation, especially among regions with
relatively high corruption levels within a given country. We thus interact the raw corruption level
of each region (since the argument should apply to highly corrupt regions in Europe) with its
relative standing within its own country (operationalised as in the experiment above, with the ratio
of regional corruption over the country average). Given that respondents are nested in regions
and countries, and considering the dichotomous character of our dependent variable, we use
hierarchical logit random intercept models to correct for heteroscedasticity and obtain accurate
standard errors (Hox 2010).
The first model in Table 5 shows a fully specified model testing the effect of national corruption.
The second model tests the effect of regional corruption. Both models control for higher education,
the Erikson et al.’s (1979) social class scheme, gender and age. It also controls for national
pride, political orientation (measured on a 1–10 left–right ideology scale) and a dummy variable
capturing whether the respondent would vote for a party in the national government (vs. any
other party) as documented by the ParlGov dataset (Döring & Manow 2019).10 In terms of
macro-level covariates, we control for national and regional GDP per capita,11 and the political
saliency of centre–periphery and territorial conflicts from the Comparative Manifesto Dataset12
(Volkens et al. 2019). These covariates aim at controlling for alternative explanations identified in
the previous literature, including economic, partisan and identity determinants of decentralisation
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Table 5. Hierarchical logit models on support for sub-national government
Model 1 Model 2
National level of corruption 0.15** –
(0.06)
Regional level of corruption – 3.28**
(1.13)
Relative regional corruption level within country – −0.07
(0.24)






Higher education 0.12* 0.15*
(0.06) (0.07)
Service class (ref.) ∓ –




Skilled manual −0.07 −0.05
(0.07) (0.08)
Semi-unskilled manual 0.08 0.09
(0.07) (0.08)
National pride 0.13* 0.02
(0.06) (0.07)
Left-right scale −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Support for incumbent party −0.01 0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
Country GDP p.c. (PPP) 1.05e-13 −3.45e-14
(1.93e-13) (2.02e-13)
Salience centre–periphery −0.13 −0.05
(0.07) (0.08)
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Table 5. Continued
Model 1 Model 2
Country intercept variance 0.24** 0.19*
(0.08) (0.08)
Regional intercept variance – 0.1***
(0.03)
N (individuals) 9,767 7,602
N(countries) 22 16
N (regions) – 136
Log Likelihood −6,419.67 −4,966.995
BIC 12,977.14 10,094.84
Source: EVS 1999, regional Quality of Government dataset, Transparency International, ParlGov, CMP, World
Bank, Eurostat, OECD. Coefficients of hierarchical logit random intercept models; standard errors between
parentheses. ***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05.
preferences. Regional GDP and individual vote intention have a significant number of missing
values, substantially reducing the sample size. Hence, Table B3 in the online Appendix replicates
the models in Table 5 on a larger sample excluding regional GDP and vote intention. The results
remain unchanged.
In line with our previous findings, the first model in Table 5 shows that national corruption
is consistently associated with higher preferences for subnational power, with a highly significant
(p < 0.01) and positive coefficient. The second model shows a negative and significant interaction
term (p < 0.05), indicating that decentralisation preferences decrease in regions with high
corruption levels and that are relatively corrupt within their own country.
To visualise the key findings in Table 5, Figure 3 plots the correlation between the Empirical
Bayes estimations of country intercepts13 (i.e. predicted average support for local power) and
national corruption. The relationship is strong and significant. Importantly, Spain is around
average on the distribution of our dependent and independent variables, which suggests that our
experimental evidence is not based on an outlier. Figure 3 also plots the marginal effects of regional
corruption (Y-axis) conditional on the relative position of the region vis-à-vis its country average
(X-axis), on the basis of the second model in Table 5. As shown in the right graph, regional
corruption levels significantly depress preferences for decentralisation especially for regions that
are highly corrupt within their country. When regions over-perform in their national context even
if they are corrupt, it is more rational to prefer strong local power.
Conclusion
Recent developments towards decentralisation, and in some cases, attempts of secession have
sparked scholarly interest in the factors explaining individual support for decentralisation and
secession. Scholars are puzzled by the reactivation of regionalism and centre–periphery conflicts.
As the complexities of multilevel governance increase and as regional disparities fuel anti-
globalisation backlash, the geographical locus of power has become highly disputed.
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Figure 3. Corruption predicting average support for subnational power. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source: EVS 1999, Transparency International, QoG, ParlGov, CMP, World Bank, Eurostat, OECD.
When studying sub-national regional conflicts, most studies have focused on ‘extreme
cases’ – regions with striking cultural and socio-economic differences vis-à-vis the rest of
the country such as Catalonia, Quebec or Flanders. By concentrating on these cases and by
emphasising economic and cultural differences, extant literature has largely ignored political
performance as a cause of claims for decentralisation and independence. A notable exception is
the study by Guinjoan & Rodon (2014) who argue that support for decentralisation is endogenous
to the quality of governance. This study uses observational data and shows that satisfaction with
regional government is related to support for decentralisation.
This paper further sheds light on this understudied aspect by analysing the effect of citizens’
awareness of corruption at national and regional levels of government. We have tested the internal
validity of our claims via an original survey experiment in Spain, and we have confirmed
their external validity using cross-national data. We find that central-level corruption directly
increases support for decentralisation, and indirectly increases support for decentralisation and
self-determination through dissatisfaction towards the national government. We also find that the
effects of regional-level corruption depend on how high regional corruption is, and on the relative
position of the region within its own country. Even in a context of regional corruption, relatively
well-performing regions prefer the status quo over the potential costs of centralising power and
sharing responsibility with under-performing regions. By contrast, the benefits of unitary states
appear more evident in highly corrupt regions that underperform relative to their country average.
Our findings have important implications for research and policy making. Firstly, corruption
of the central government spurs demand for decentralisation and even self-determination,
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independently from economic considerations, collective identity and partisan attachments. This
sheds light on rapid increases of secessionist movements that have been able to mobilise citizens
with different forms and intensities of national identification (Serrano 2013). This finding also
shifts the analytical level from economically and culturally distinct regions to the central state that
provides poor political outputs.
Secondly, we extend and confirm the compensation model of political support to sub-
national conflicts (Bauhr & Charron 2018; De Vries 2018; Kritzinger 2003; Muñoz et al. 2011;
Rohrschneider 2002; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). Rational benchmarking is a relevant heuristic to
assess the competing advantages of proximal and salient institutional contexts like the national and
the regional ones. The compensation mechanism becomes useful to understand why nationalistic
backlashes occur in some regions and not in others, even in the absence of major ethnic
differences. While relatively underperforming regions within their national context prefer to
transfer sovereignty, relatively over-performing regions see less cost in decentralisation.
Finally, while classical macro-perspectives on decentralisation have regarded the provision
of public goods as a mechanism for the emergence of modern federations (Riker 1975; Ziblatt
2004), the link had never been tested at the micro-level. From a normative perspective, this finding
somewhat challenges efforts of central governments to retain power in centre–periphery conflicts:
claims for decentralisation are not merely caused by utilitarianism or competing collective
identities, but also seem to be a reaction to poor quality of governance at the central level.
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Notes
1. The Autonomous Communities (Comunidades Autonomas) are the highest and most salient subnational level
of political authority and administration in Spain. We use the terms autonomous communities and regions
interchangeably.
2. Respondents were recruited by the international survey company Respondi: https://www.respondi.com/en/. We
imposed quotas for age, gender, education and region based on official statistics. In most cases, the deviations
between sample and population are around 1 per cent, and they are always below 3 per cent, with the following
exceptions: People with elementary education are overrepresented (6 per cent deviation), and respondents from
Andalusia are underrepresented (5 per cent deviation).
3. It is worth noting that in the regional corruption prime, we do not refer to particular autonomous communities,
but instead refer to ‘politicians of different regional governments’. While referring to specific regions might
have made the regional treatment stronger, doing so might also lead to bias and activate unintended cultural
and social stereotypes associated with the popularity of these regions. Moreover, our benchmarking theoretical
framework requires priming on corruption at the regional level in general, so that the respondent assesses the
convenience of centralization depending on the situation of her own region relative to others.
4. We use the plotplain and plotting package written by Bischof (2017).
5. Table A6 in the Online Appendix shows the interaction effects on the other preference categories as well.
6. The ‘Mediation’ package in R does not support multinomial logit models, so ordered logit models are used
instead. To avoid post-treatment bias, the controls are strictly exogenous: education (dummy for having a
university degree), age and being female.
7. European Values Study (2011). EVS - European Values Study 1999 - Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive,
Cologne. ZA3811. Data file Version 3.0.0, https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10789.
8. http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (04/05/2020).
9. Table B2 in the online Appendix replicates the main models of interest with an alternative measure of
quality of national government imported from the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al. 2020):
https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata (04/05/2020).
10. http://www.parlgov.org (04/05/2020).
11. The national GDP per capita data are from Worldbank datasets https://data.worldbank.org (04/05/2020).
The regional GDP per capita data refers to 2000 as no data from 1999 were available and are taken
from Eurostat https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/regions/data/database (04/05/2020), with the exception of
Denmark, Hungary, Poland and Sweden where we relied on data from OECD: http://www.oecd.org/
governance/regional-policy/regionalstatisticsandindicators.htm (04/05/2020).
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12. This measure corresponds to the weighted average of variable 301 across the whole party system: positive
mentions to federalism or decentralization of political/economic power for the last national election before the
fieldwork process of the EVS 1999 in each country. We have weighted the average by the number of seats that
each party obtained in that election. See https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu (04/05/2020).
13. Denoted as βEB0 j = ω jβLogit0 j + (1 − ω j )y00, where β0 j is the intercept of a given country j, y00 is the mean
preference for local power across countries and ω j is the reliability of the outcome in a given country.
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